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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
BRIAN M. BARNARD,
Case No. 91 - 0390

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

APPELLANT'S
BRIEF IN REPLY
TO BRIEF OF APPELLEES.

UTAH STATE BAR,
STEPHEN TROST,
and
RALPH ADAMS,

(Priority No. 16)

Defendants/Appellees.
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, BRIAN M. BARNARD, by and through
counsel John Pace and Brian M. Barnard of the Utah Legal
Clinic, submits this REPLY BRIEF in response to arguments
raised by Appellees in their brief.
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW BY APPELLEES
BUT NOT CONSIDERED BY TRIAL COURT
Appellees' answer in the trial court recited that Bar
Counsel was immune from suit under Rule XVI of the
Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar.
court declined to rule on that defense.

The trial

Appellees' recent

brief suggests that this Court should consider and rule for
the first time in this case:

Whether the Utah State Bar

Counsel is immune from any and all suits, even actions in
1

equity challenging their conduct and policies or the rules
they seek to enforce.

Appellees' Brief, p. 3; pp. 24-25.

Appellant would welcome considercition of this issue and
a determination by this Court of the unconstitutionality of
Rule XVI of the Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State
Bar.

However, there is serious question whether that

immunity issue i£ properly before this Court.
FACTS
Appellant feels compelled to respond to a repeated misstatement of fact by appellees.

Appellees repeat that

decisions of the Utah State Bar and its committees regarding
discipline "are advisory only to the Supreme Court, which
retains the inherent power to admit, discipline or disbar
members of the Bar," and cite Barnard v. Utah State Bar, 158
Ut.Adv.Rep. 3 (Utah 1991).

Appellees' Brief, p. 8; p. 11;

p. 17; p. 20; p. 22; p. 23. Appellees erroneously claim the
Utah State Bar has no power to impose disciplinary sanctions
absent approval of this Court.1

1

Related to Appellees' misunderstanding of the
Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar is the
appellees' suggestion (Appellee's Brief, p. 23) that this
Court is the real party in interest in this case. When a
criminal statute is challenged as unconstitutional in a
declaratory judgment action, a prosecutor, the person
charged with prosecuting under the statute, is named
defendant. The legislature, the government body that
enacted the questioned statute, is not named as defendant,
neither is the trial court that might enforce the statute.
2

The Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar
provide that "The Board [of Bar Commissioners] has power to
impose a private reprimand" upon an attorney (Rule VII (e),
Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar) without
review or supervision by this Court.

Similarly, a private

admonition may be issued by the Utah State Bar without the
involvement of this Court.

Id., Rule VII (f). See also

Rules IX and X, Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State
Bar.
This Court erred in setting forth in Barnard v. Utah
State Bar. 158 Ut.Adv.Rep. 3 (Utah 1991) the powers of the
Utah State Bar Board of Commissioners vis-a-vis disciplinary
sanctions, and Appellees delight in repeating that erroneous
information.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant in this action sought a determination as to
whether his use of paralegals in providing information and
assistance to his divorce clients constituted the unethical
aiding the unauthorized practice of law.

Appellees' Brief,

p. 16.
Appellant Barnard did not violate Rule 11 by seeking a
declaratory judgment regarding Utah State Bar rules and the
conduct and policies of the Utah State Bar and Bar Counsel
in the Third Judicial District Court instead of in this

a

Court,

The District Court has subject matter jurisdiction

to grant the relief sought by Barnard.
Appellant presented a justiciable case or controversy
to the trial court and conducted reasonable pre-filing
research and investigation regarding the applicable law.
Moreover, despite the trial court having determined that the
complaint did not present a case or controversy, the filing
of this action was not so egregious as to warrant Rule 11
sanctions.

The history and purpose of Rule 11 dictate

against the imposition of sanctions in an action where
reasonable preparation is made before the filing, where the
law is unclear as to jurisdiction, and where the law
demonstrates that a viable case or controversy may exist.

ARGUMENT
POINT

I

BARNARD'S COMPLAINT PRESENTED A VIABLE CASE OR
CONTROVERSY TO THE DISTRICT COURT.
At the time Barnard sought a Declaratory Judgment in
the Third District Court he was subject to an active
complaint against him and an on-going investigation of his
professional conduct.

Appellees admitted that their

investigation of plaintiff was continuing.

Defendants7

Dismissal Memorandum, 5 10, p. 6; 5 16, p. 8; Aff. of Def.
Adams, p. 3; p. 6.

Appellees had made a determination that
4

the charges against Barnard had some potential validity.
Procedures of Discipline, Rule VIII (g). The second letter
from Adams to Barnard dated January 8, 1991 specifically
states that Adams, as Bar Counsel has initiated a complaint
against Barnard, the first step in the Utah State Bar's
disciplinary process.

Exhibit, Aff. of Def. Adams, T.R. p.

112; Rule VIII (a), Procedures of Discipline ("A disciplinary proceeding may be initiated . . . by . . . Bar Counsel .
. . by filing with the Bar a written complaint in ordinary,
plain and concise language setting forth the acts or
omissions . . .") .
Barnard, who continued to provide pro se divorce
information to individuals and whose practice would suffer
injury if forced to deny help to this segment of his
clientele, sought a Declaratory Judgment that this practice
did not constitute assisting the unauthorized practice of
law.

Despite the clear clash of interests between the

parties, appellees allege that Barnard's concerns and
complaint did not present the District Court with a
justiciable case or controversy.

5

A.

BARNARD'S ACTION SEEKING TO PREVENT A WRONG
PRESENTED A JUSTICIABLE CASE AND CONTROVERSY,
Under a United States Supreme Court definition, an

action to prevent a wrong presents a justiciable case or
controversy.

In defining the principles that determined

whether a case could be properly brought under judicial
cognizance, the United States Supreme Court in Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Brimson determined:
the'terms 'cases' and 'controversies' in the
Constitution embraced the claims or contentions of
litigants brought before the courts for adjudication by
regular proceedings established for the protection or
enforcement of rights, or the prevention, redress, or
punishment of wrongs,
154 U.S. 1047, 1057 (1894) (quotations omitted).

Black's

Law Dictionary cites that decision to define the term case
or controversy.

A case or controversy exists when a claim

is brought to protect or enforce rights and to prevent
wrongs.
Principles articulated by the United States Supreme
Court make it clear that threatened injury can be sufficient
to present a case or controversy.

In Employers Association

of New Jersey v. State of New Jersey, 601 F.Supp. 232
(1985), an organization of employers sued for declaratory
and injunctive relief invalidating provisions of a state
insurance act as preempted by federal law.

The employers

were concerned that they would be affected by a future
increase in insurance premiums.
6

Id. at 237.

Determining

the employers had standing and that the case was ripe for
adjudication the court stated, "it is also clear that
threatened injury is sufficient for standing and that a case
may be ripe for preventive relief without compelling
litigants 'to await the consummation of threatened injury.7"
Id. at 238 (citing Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State
Energy Resources. 461 U.S. 190, 201 (1983)).
Barnard was likewise threatened by a potential injury.
The contingencies which lay between the Bar's allegations of
misconduct against him and a possible disciplinary action
against him for aiding the unauthorized practice of law were
not unlike those in Employers Association.

The court there

was "not persuaded that the contingencies which lie between
the present and a potential increase in premiums . . . are
sufficient to deprive plaintiff of standing to sue or to
make this case unripe for disposition . . .."

Id.

Neither

should this Court be persuaded that the threat of punishment
for unprofessional conduct hanging over an attorney does not
merit declaratory action.
The Employers Association court justly determined that
"[t]he threatened injury is neither speculative nor remote.
Waiting until the threat of higher premiums becomes a
reality will add nothing to the clarity of the legal issues
not already before this court.

Nor will it add to

plaintiffs' stake in the controversy stated herein."
7

Id.

Barnard similarly could not have benefitted by waiting.
Accusations of unethical conduct in aiding the unauthorized
practice of law, made by the Hon. Timothy Hanson and Bar
Counsel, hovering over Barnard's practice warranted
expedient judicial disposition.2
Barnard sought pre-emption; thus, the argument against
justiciability based on the then existing factual issues is
a weak one.

Indeed, "where the merits of the case involve

the predominantly legal question of pre-emption, to the
extent that prudential concerns of constitutional
adjudication are implicated, a trial on the factual issues
which underlie justiciability would be senseless."

Icl. In

other words, since Barnard was seeking a declaration that
his conduct was not the unethical aiding of the unauthorized
practice of law before the Bar declared that it was so, the
only relevant factual issue regarding justiciability was
that the threat of accusation existed and he was seeking to
prevent such injury.

2

To date, no further action against Barnard by Bar
Counsel has been taken. Now, more than one and one/half
years after Judge Hanson's expressed concern and Ralph
Adams' first letter of accusation, Barnard is still in limbo
as to whether his use of paralegals in assisting divorce
clients constitutes aiding the unauthorized practice of law.
8

B.

BARNARD'S COMPLAINT SEEKING DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
AGAINST THE UTAH STATE BAR AND BAR COUNSEL PRESENTED A
JUSTICIABLE CASE AND CONTROVERSY AND DID NOT SEEK AN
ADVISORY OPINION,
A controversy of sufficient immediacy existed between

Barnard and the Utah State Bar and Bar Counsel to warrant
the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

They had adverse

legal interests in that Barnard wished to have the trial
court determine that his conduct was not aiding the
unauthorized practice of law while the Bar demanded that
Barnard respond to its complaint that his conduct was aiding
the unauthorized practice of law.
Appellees7 argument that the case was not yet ready for
judicial determination is in error.

The general principles

on the issue of case or controversy as applied to
declaratory judgments instruct that:
The difference between an abstract question and a
"controversy11 contemplated by the Declaratory Judgment
Act is necessarily one of degree, and it would be
difficult, if it would be possible, to fashion a
precise test for determining in every case whether
there is such a controversy. Basically, the question
in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all
the circumstances, show that there is a substantial
controversy, between parties having adverse legal
interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to
warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.
Societe de Conditionnement v. Hunter Engineering, 655 F.2d
938, 942 (9th Cir.) (1981) (quoting Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)).

9

See

also

Babbitt v. United Farm Workers National Union, 442 U.S. 289,
297 (1979).
Keeping in mind that

fl

[t]he difference between an

abstract question and a 'case or controversy' is necessarily
one of degree . . . and is not discernible by any precise
test," Babbitt at 297, this court should consider the
purposes of a declaratory remedy.

The Utah Declaratory

Judgment Act, Ut. Code Ann. §§ 78-33-1 et seq (1953 as
amended), is similar in language and intent to the Federal
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201.

In discussing

the Federal Act, the court in State Farm Fire and Casualty
Co. v. Taylor stated:
The purpose of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act is
remedial and procedural . . . One of its purposes is
to provide a remedy in situations in which an actual
dispute exists over the rights and obligations of
parties even though the controversy has not yet matured
to a point where a coercive remedy is available. . . .
[I]n determining whether to entertain a declaratory
action, a court should consider whether a useful
practical purpose will be served thereby; in other
words, does the declaratory plaintiff need the remedy.
. . . A declaration of rights and obligations is
useful if it prevents the accrual of damages.
Additionally, a declaration may be useful if it
relieves a party from acting at his peril while
uncertain of his legal rights because another party is
yet to bring a coercive action.
118 F.R.D. 426, 429 (M.D.N.C. 1988) (citations omitted).
the present case all these purposes of declaratory relief
are served.

A coercive action has not yet been brought

against Appellant, yet he was asked to respond to
10

In

allegations that he is aiding the unauthorized practice of
law.

Appellant provides information to individuals

regarding pro se divorces as part of his practice and uses
paralegals in doing so.

If such practice is indeed the

unauthorized practice of law, then a declaratory action
would resolve a dispute and prevent harm.

A declaratory

action would relieve Barnard from "acting at his peril while
uncertain of his legal rights because another party is yet
to bring a coercive action."
C.

BARNARD HAD A RIGHT TO SEEK A DECLARATORY REMEDY TO
PREVENT FUTURE HARM.
Barnard had a right to prevent the possible accrual of

damages.

In discussing the purposes of the declaratory

remedy, the court in Societe quoted:
The Declaratory Judgment Act was designed to relieve
potential defendants from the Damoclean threat of
impending litigation which a harassing adversary might
brandish, while initiating suit at his leisure—or
never.
Societe at 943 (quoting Japan Gas Lighter Assoc, v. Ronson
Corp.. 257 F.Supp. 219, 237 (D.N.J. 1966)).

Invocation of a

declaratory remedy in effect "brings to the present a
litigable controversy, which otherwise might only by [sic]
tried in the future."

Societe at 943.

The purpose of the Utah Declaratory Judgment Act, Ut.
Code Ann. §§ 78-33-1 et seq (1953 as amended), is to protect
parties from the harm the enforcement of a questionable law
11

might cause.

In Utah Restaurants Assoc, v. Davis City Board

of Health, this Court stated that the Utah Declaratory
Judgment Act "should be construed to fulfill the original
purpose of subjecting laws to judicial scrutiny before
enforcement against affected citizens."
(Utah 1985).

709 P.2d 1159, 1162

This court explained that the word "laws" has

to be construed broadly so as to encompass "challenges of
administrative agency rules by actions for declaratory
judgment."

Id.

In the present case, there is a "law," an

ethical proscription, against assisting the unauthorized
practice of law.

Mr. Barnard received two (2) letters from

the Utah State Bar; one alleged that Mr. Barnard7s conduct
was a violation of Rule 5.5(b) of the Rules of Professional
Conduct, and the other informed Mr. Barnard that the Bar
Counsel had initiated a complaint based upon his use of
paralegals.
Mr. Barnard has standing to seek a declaratory action
determining whether his method of providing pro se divorce
information is indeed unethical.

This Court articulates the

standard that a plaintiff "must be able to show that he has
suffered some distinct and palpable injury that gives him a
personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute."
(citations omitted).

Id.

Because providing divorce information

is part of how Mr. Barnard makes his living, an allegation
that by doing such he has violated a Rule of Professional
12

Conduct and the initiation of a complaint against him by the
Bar Counsel confers standing upon him.

Barnard's "rights,

status or other legal relations are affected."
Ann. § 78-33-2 (1953 as amended).

Ut. Code

Because Mr. Barnard has

been providing such information to the public for many years
through paralegals, he has a strong "personal stake in the
outcome" of this legal dispute.

Utah Restaurant at 1162.

Furthermore, given Mr. Barnard's long practice, the
State Bar's only recent action in taking steps against him
lends support for a declaratory action.

As stated in State

Farm, "[a] useful purpose may be served [by a declaratory
action] if the party entitled to bring a coercive action
fails or delays in bringing it. . . . [and] if it relieves a
party from acting at his peril while uncertain of his legal
rights because another party is yet to bring a coercive
action."

State Farm at 429.

Therefore, Mr. Barnard presents a justiciable
controversy in which he brings a claim "before the courts
for adjudication by regular proceedings established for the
protection or enforcement of rights, or the prevention,
redress, or punishment of wrongs" as defined by the United
States Supreme Court.

Also, Mr. Barnard seeks a declaration

of his rights and obligations because he needs immediate
remedy to prevent injury, a disciplinary action against him.
Appellees suggest that Barnard must wait until he "had been
13

disciplined or had been forced to halt his practice"
(Appellees' Brief, p. 22) before he could bring a
declaratory judgment action.

If that suggestion is correct,

and is upheld by this Court, it would mean the judicial
repeal of the Declaratory Judgment Act.

Resolving disputes

prior to injury is a specific aim of the Declaratory
Judgment Act.
The limitations on the availability of a declaratory
remedy are distinguishable.

For example, in State Farm, the

Court states, ,fa court may be induced to deny declaratory
relief if the judgment sought would not settle the
controversy between the parties."

Id. at 429.

In the

present case, a declaration that providing divorce
information through attorney supervised paralegals is not
the unauthorized practice of law would easily and clearly
settle the controversy between Barnard and the State Bar.
Mr. Barnard's suit for declaratory action presents a
justiciable controversy ripe for adjudication.

Defendant

argues that Mr. Barnard's suit seeks merely an advisory
opinion from the Court.

However, "[t]he difference between

an abstract question calling for an advisory opinion and a
ripe 'case or controversy' is one of degree, not discernible
by any precise test."

Wisconsin's Environmental Decade v.

State Bar of Wisconsin, 747 F.2d 407, 410 (1984) (citing
Babbitt v. United Farm Workers National Union, 442 U.S. 289,
14

297 (1979)).

The issue involves whether there is a

substantial controversy between parties with adverse legal
interests.

Environmental Decade at 411 (citations omitted).

In this case, Judge Timothy Hanson and Bar Counsel alleged
that Mr. Barnard is aiding the unauthorized practice of law
while Mr. Barnard asserts that he is engaging only in the
authorized practice by use of paralegals.

Providing

information through supervised paralegals is part of Mr.
Barnard's long time practice.

Thus, the parties have

adverse legal interests, and Mr. Barnard should not be
required to wait, possibly at his peril, while Bar Counsel
decides whether to take coercive action.
POINT II
MEMBERS OF THE DISCIPLINARY STAFF OF THE UTAH
STATE BAR ARE NOT IMMUNE FROM SUITS IN EQUITY.
Appellees suggest that they are personally immune from
suit of any kind according to Rule XVI of the Procedures of
Discipline of the Utah State Bar.

Mr. Barnard submits that

this provision is unconstitutional under the due process
protections of the Utah and United States Constitutions as
well as under the Open Courts Clause, Art. I, § 11 of the
Utah Constitution.

Although Rule XVI on its face provides

immunity from all suits whether at law or in equity for Bar
Counsel, such a provision is constitutionally untenable.
Whether in district court or before this Court, Bar Counsel
15

must be answerable in equity and subject to the controlling
powers of a court especially in a case such as this seeking
only declaratory and injunctive relief.

Appellant would

suggest that the intent of Rule XVI is that Bar Counsel is
immune from any claim for damages.

Such a provision would

be appropriate and constitutional in light of the quasijudicial functions of Bar Counsel.

However, Bar Counsel

cannot be above the law in equity.
The claim of total immunity under Rule XVI was not
ruled upon by Judge Moffat in the trial court.

Thus, the

issue of immunity is not properly before this Court.
POINT

III

THE APPEAL IN BARNARD V, SUTLIFF
IS IRRELEVANT.
Appellees incorrectly argue that even if this case did
present a case or controversy, declaratory relief would have
been inappropriate.

Appellees cite McCrae & DeLand v.

Feltch, 669 P.2d 404 (Utah 1983) in support of that claim.
That case i£ inapposite to issues in the case at bar.
McCrae sought a declaratory judgment in a separate and new
action when a pending criminal action could have served as
the appropriate vehicle for a ruling on the issue raised in

16

the declaratory judgment suit.

There has been no filing of

such parallel actions in this case.3
Appellees erroneously state that "the issue Barnard
sought to present in this case, that is, whether the
District Court shares this Court's jurisdiction to regulate
the practice of law, was presently the subject of an appeal
in the Barnard v. Sutliff suit." Appellees' Brief, p. 23.
The issue Barnard presented in this case was whether his
conduct in providing pro se divorce information through
paralegals was aiding the unauthorized practice of law.
Appellees' Brief, p. 16.

Defendants/Appellees argued that

the District Court has no jurisdiction.

The anticipated

ruling from this Court in Barnard v. Sutliff will not
resolve the question as to the propriety of Barnard's use of
paralegals, although the ruling in Sutliff may be relevant
to appellees' defense herein of lack of jurisdiction.4

3

Appellees might have a valid argument under McCrae.
if a formal disciplinary action was in progress before the
Utah State Bar. Appellees could then argue, Barnard should
resolve the question of what is or isn't "the unauthorized
practice of law" in the disciplinary proceeding. However,
as appellees have not so succinctly told us, there is no
formal disciplinary action pending against Barnard.
4

Worthy of note, appellant sought a stay in this
case, opposed by appellees, to await a decision by this
Court in Barnard v. Sutliff.
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POINT IV
RULE 11 SANCTIONS WERE INAPPROPRIATE.
The motion for Rule 11 sanctions was unfounded and
should have been denied.

There is no clear law that the

District Court lacks jurisdiction to hear litigation
involving the Utah State Bar and Bar Counsel or seeking
declaratory judgments as to Utah State Bar rules.

Barnard

presented a justiciable case and controversy to the trial
court.

Even if the action brought before the trial court

did not presented a case or controversy, such did not
warrant the imposition of sanctions.

By imposing sanctions

in this action seeking equitable relief from present and
threatened future harm the trial court abused its
discretion.
A.

IT WAS REASONABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES FOR
MR. BARNARD TO SEEK RELIEF.
It was reasonable for Mr. Barnard to pursue his claim.

In Avionic Company v. General Dynamics Corp., the Court
stated, "[w]hen reviewing a motion for sanctions pursuant to
Rule 11, this Court must determine whether the party's
conduct was reasonable under the circumstances."
36, 37 (E.D.Mo. 1990).

133 F.R.D.

Given that the State Bar accused him

of unethical conduct, initiated a complaint and disciplinary
proceeding and was investigating his alleged aiding the
unauthorized practice of law, Mr. Barnard was undeniably
18

hampered in his legal practice•

Seeking a declaratory

judgment to determine his rights and obligations to prevent
wrongs by his continued practice is reasonable and
legitimate.
B.

MR. BARNARD CONDUCTED A REASONABLE AND ADEQUATE PREFILING INVESTIGATION AS REQUIRED BY RULE 11.
Pursuant to the Rule 11 requirement that a party make a

reasonable inquiry into the status of the law upon which an
action is based, Mr. Barnard conducted a reasonable
investigation before filing his complaint.

His pre-filing

preparation included an examination of the law regarding the
jurisdiction of the District Court.

Mr. Barnard relied, in

part, upon prior rulings of three (3) judges of the Salt
Lake County Third Judicial District Court (Judges Rigtrup,
Sawaya and Wilkinson) in which they exercised jurisdiction
over the Bar's agents, actions and policies.

Neerinas v.

Utah State Bar, 166 Ut.Adv.Rep. 13, 817 P.2d 320 (Utah
1991); Barnard v. Utah State Bar, 158 Ut.Adv.Rep. 3, 804
P.2d 526 (Utah 1991); and, Barnard v. Utah State Bar, Case
No. C-80-6127 discussed at pp. 16-17 of Appellant's Brief.
C.

MR. BARNARD'S COMPLAINT PRESENTED A JUSTICIABLE CASE
AND CONTROVERSY TO THE COURT.
Under the principles established by the United States

Supreme Court and discussed above, Barnard's complaint
seeking to prevent harm presented a case or controversy.
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He

acted under the threat of injury from an accusation of
unprofessional conduct,

Barnard sought a declaration

against the State Bar that providing divorce information
through supervised paralegals is not aiding the unauthorized
practice of law.
The United States Supreme Court has expressly mandated
that persons in the position of Mr. Barnard should not have
fl

to await the consummation of threatened injury."

Gas & Electric Co., 461 U.S. at 201.

Pacific

Indeed, "it is * . .

clear that threatened injury is sufficient for standing and
that a case may be ripe for preventive relief," without
making the complainant wait at his peril.

Id.

This is a viable case and controversy seeking equitable
relief against a party with adverse legal interests.

As

established previously, the difference between an advisory
opinion and a ripe case or controversy is one of degree and
is not discernible by any precise test.

On a spectrum this

case lies closer to a "case and controversy" than a "mere
abstract question".

The case law supports this position.

The principles enunciated above demonstrate that threatened
injury is more than just arguably sufficient to state viable
case and controversy.

Therefore, the imposition of Rule 11

sanctions for the seeking of prevention of injury and a
determination of rights was erroneous.
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D.

IF DOUBTS EXIST REGARDING THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS
THEY SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF BARNARD.
In considering a motion for Rule 11 sanctions, any

doubts must be resolved in favor of Mr. Barnard.
Hare. 682 F.Supp. 1528, 1535 (D.Utah 1988).

Edwards v.

One of the

reasons for this assumption is that Rule 11 sanctions are
not meant to "chill an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity
in pursuing factual or legal theories."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 Advisory Committee Note)„

Id.

(citing

Therefore, if any

doubts remain after consideration of the ambiguity of the
law regarding jurisdiction over the Bar, the supporting
United States Supreme Court case law regarding threatened
injury and the case or controversy requirements, and the
good faith policy reasons why a declaratory remedy may have
been warranted, Barnard should be afforded their benefit.
Finally, a court should be careful in judging an
attorney's action with the benefit of hindsight.

In Eastway

Construction Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F.Supp. 558
(E.D.N.Y. 1986), the court stated, "[i]f an attorney makes a
reasonable investigation under the circumstances and
concludes based on that investigation that the pleading is
well grounded in law and fact, he cannot be sanctioned for
filing the pleading when time and discovery prove that the
plaintiff does not in fact have a viable claim."
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"The difference between an abstract question calling
for an [impermissible] advisory opinion and a ripe 'case or
controversy' is one of degree, not discernible by any
precise test." Wisconsin's Environmental Decade v, State
Bar of Wisconsin. 747 F.2d 407, 410 (1984) (citing Babbitt
v. United Farm Workers National Union, 442 U.S. 289, 297
(1979)).

The existence of a case or controversy being a

"matter of degree" and the determination being a very fact
specific inquiry, the routine imposition of Rule 11
sanctions for lack of a case or controversy is questionable.
Only if there was no reasonable arguable possibility that a
case or controversy existed, should Rule 11 sanctions be
imposed.
Appellees repeat in their Brief "the Bar was only in
the initial stages of its investigation and had made no
determination . . . about whether Barnard's conduct was
appropriate . . . "

Appellees' Brief, p. 9; p. 10; p. 14; p.

15; p. 18; p. 25. Thus, appellees suggest that some where,
maybe just beyond the initial stage of the investigation, or
maybe at step three of the investigation, there would have
been a case or controversy appropriate for the trial court
to consider.

This emphasizes the varying degrees involved,

as a finder of fact moves across a spectrum, to determine if
there is a case or controversy..
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The mere fact that Judge Moffat found there to be no
case or controversy, is not sufficient to warrant sanctions.
Only if no reasonable lawyer could, with a straight face,
argue that a case or controversy was present would Rule 11
sanctions be appropriate.
CONCLUSION
Whether a District Court has jurisdiction over Bar
Counsel and jurisdiction to resolve questions as to the
rules of the Utah State Bar is an issue yet to be determined
by this Court.

The lack of jurisdiction, if that there be,

is not so obvious as to warrant sanctions against
appellant.
Whether appellant presented to the trial court a viable
"case or controversy" is, at worst, a close call.

Such a

determination is a very factual specific examination and
requires the consideration of "matters of degrees."

The

lack of a case or controversy, if that there be, is not so
obvious as to warrant the impositions of sanctions against
appellant in this matter.
The imposition of sanctions against appellant by the
trial court was an error of law and an abuse of discretion.
This Court should reverse the dismissal of appellant's
complaint, determining that the District Court had
jurisdiction to hear this matter and that appellant
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presented a case or controversy; this Court should reverse
the finding of a violation of Rule 11, Ut.ReCiv.Pro. and
vacate the sanctions in the form of the judgment against
appellant for attorney fees; and, this Court should remand
this case for further proceedings in the trial court.
DATED this 15th day of JUNE, 1992.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Appellant/
Plaintiff
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